Stanisław Janeczek beschäftigt sich beruflich mit der Geschichte der neuzeitlichen Philosophie und der Geschichte der Erziehung mit dem Schwerpunkt polnische Philosophie, vor allem die der Neuzeit. Der direkte Anlaß zur Entstehung des vorliegenden, enorm umfangreichen Buches war die geschichtliche Untersuchung des Logik-Unterrichts, wie er im Schul- und Studienprogram der Kommission für Nationale Erziehung vorgesehen wurde. Die Kommission hat den Logikunterricht in den Gymnasien auf die Praxis bezogen und ihn aus den Hochschulen gestrichen. Dieselben Maßnahmen haben den ganzen Philosophieunterricht betroffen. (...) Das besprochene Buch soll dem Autor zufolge eine bisherige Lücke schließen und auf eine systematische Weise den Gesamtunterricht der Philosophie in den der genannten Kommission unterstellten Schulen darstellen. Als Hintergrund des wissenschaftlichen Unternehmens dient die Darstellung des damaligen Philosophie-Unterrichts in den anderen europäischen Ländern und auch die geschichtliche Entwicklung der philosophischen Ideen. (shrink)

Stanisław Witkiewicz himself taught his son Stanisław Ignacy, known later as Witkacy, helped by his wife and friends, among whom there were scientists, artists and professional teachers. The results of such education were amazing. At the age of eight, the boy could paint using different techniques, play the piano and compose music. His father desired for him to become a naturalist painter like himself. At a young age Witkacy became an outstanding artist, not only a painter, but also (...) a writer. However, in opposition to his father’s teaching, when he matured artistically, he rejected naturalism and joined the artistic avant-garde. Just after the first world war he published a long philosophical essay inspired probably by the work of his father’s great intellectual enemy – the Neo-Hegelian Polish philosopher Henryk Struve. Thus, Witkacy shaped himself, both in the respect of art and philosophy, in the opposition to his father, Stanisław Witkiewicz. (shrink)

Charity, the core of the Gospel ethos, became one of the founding ideas of European civilization and distinguished it from others. In Polish territories, as in other Western European countries, charity work was conducted primarily by the Church, which together with its sense of Gospel duty, defended the weak by concerning itself with economic development. For this purpose, charitable credit institutions, so-called mounts of piety (montes pietatis), were established. They were continued by reformers, in a somewhat changed form, until the (...) decline of the Polish Commonwealth (Republic). The most original institution of this kind was Rev. Stanisław Staszic’s foundation: the Hrubieszów Agricultural Society, which survived until the days of the Polish People’s Republic. (shrink)

Stanisław August Poniatowski (1732–1798) was the last king of Poland. He reigned from 1764 to 1795 and, during this time the first Polish constitution, the first in Europe, was established. These excerpts come from Hen’s book My Friend the King (Mój Przyjaciel Król). The book is narrated by the fictional Gaston Fabre, who is a close confidant of the King and is privy to all the turmoil and machinations at Court in months and years preceding the signing of the (...) constitution. (shrink)

Faced with the loss of a part of the Polish state’s territory, that is, after the first partitioning of Poland by the neighboring countries—Russia, Austria and Prussia—and fearing even worse possible scenario of the loss of independence, the last king of Poland Stanisław August Poniatowski made a far-sighted decision, which he implemented on 14 October, 1773, by a motion, passed by the Partition Sejm of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, establishing the Commission for National Education, prefiguring the Ministry for National Education. (...) The source of funding was the post-Jesuit property obtained by the suppression of the Jesuit Order by Pope Clement XIV; the order was abolished in Poland, as well.Cracow and Vilna universities were modernized, and these were also entrusted with the direct supervision of secondary schools, created anew as secular ones. Instruction in parochial elementary schools was carried out in Polish only; few of those were set up in the countryside, though. Entries were invited for course books in natural sciences and the history of Poland. Women were included in the state’s educational effort, too. (shrink)

Stanisław Janeczek beschäftigt sich beruflich mit der Geschichte der neuzeitlichen Philosophie und der Geschichte der Erziehung mit dem Schwerpunkt polnische Philosophie, vor allem die der Neuzeit. Der direkte Anlaß zur Entstehung des vorliegenden, enorm umfangreichen Buches war die geschichtliche Untersuchung des Logik-Unterrichts, wie er im Schul- und Studienprogram der Kommission für Nationale Erziehung vorgesehen wurde. Die Kommission hat den Logikunterricht in den Gymnasien auf die Praxis bezogen und ihn aus den Hochschulen gestrichen. Dieselben Maßnahmen haben den ganzen Philosophieunterricht betroffen. (...) Das besprochene Buch soll dem Autor zufolge eine bisherige Lücke schließen und auf eine systematische Weise den Gesamtunterricht der Philosophie in den der genannten Kommission unterstellten Schulen darstellen. Als Hintergrund des wissenschaftlichen Unternehmens dient die Darstellung des damaligen Philosophie-Unterrichts in den anderen europäischen Ländern und auch die geschichtliche Entwicklung der philosophischen Ideen. (shrink)

Part of a series of books devoted to Polish Christian Philosophy in the twentieth century, this latest study introduces the life and work of Piotr Lenartowicz. Lenartowicz, a member of the Jesuit order, held several professional positions, but spent most of his career at the Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow. Approaching philosophy from an Aristotelian- Thomistic perspective, his interests ranged over the philosophy of animate nature, the theory of evolution, topics in the philosophy of science, and epistemological issues, especially concerning (...) the nature of human cognition. (shrink)

The Jesuit Faculty of Philosophy in Cracow has existed since 1934, when it was erected by the Congregation for Seminaries and Universities. For the first 55 years it educated only the Jesuits, but since 1989 it has been opened to the laity as well. A memorial book Philosophia Rationis Magistra Vitae was published to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Faculty of Philosophy with special dedication to its Professors: Fr. Roman Darowski SJ, Fr. Piotr Lenartowicz SJ, and Fr. Stanislaw Ziemiański (...) SJ. All of them have worked at the former Faculty of Philosophy which is now the Faculty of Philosophy of Ignatianum. In these past few years, Fr. Ziemiański and Fr. Lenartowicz have celebrated their 70th birthday, during this year Fr. Darowski will celebrate such jubilee. The book consists of two volumes. The first contains congratulatory letters from Provincials of the Polish Jesuits to the Jubilarians. It also contains a short history of the Jesuit Faculty of Philosophy in Cracow, and provides presentations of the professors celebrating their anniversaries. (shrink)

The existence of differences in time, meant to be structure ‹T,<›, where the earlier-later relation < is a linear ordering, dense and without the first and the last element, is a sine qua non condition of changes taking place at any temporal instant. Therefore it is impossible to give a definition of the operator of change ↑ (the intended meaning of the phrase „↑α” is „it is changing now what a states”) in the language Lͭ of Tense Logic calculi containing, (...) besides classical sentential connectives, temporal categories: G, H, F, P. The paper contains the proof of this statement. (shrink)

The book by professor Stanisław Kowalczyk, renowned scholar in the field of social philosophy, is, without doubt, one of the most important studies on the idea of freedom. The concept of freedom is as old as mankind. It has many meanings and has been interpreted in many different ways. For instance, we also have the word „liberty," which means „freedom or right" and is synonymous with the word freedom, which means „the condition of being free." The author indicates that (...) in our times the notion of freedom is most frequently used; however, it is often misused or deceptive. Mass media and people of all walks of life talk of liberty; everyone talks of freedom and, for many, it is the highest value. Longing for freedom is rooted in the heart of every human being, for freedom is an existential correlate and the fulfilment of the rational human being. The semantic confusion about the notion of freedom leads to many misuses of the concept. Personalism, as a philosophical concept in which a person stands in the centre of all discussion, serves as a framework for the author's delineation on the concept of freedom. He further states that the appropriate understanding of this value is possible in the context of the personalistic interpretation of a human being. This is the focus of this informative and insightful book. (shrink)

The Belgian conflict can be compared with a game theoretical model with two groups and a negative sum-game. Within each of the groups there is hierarchisation, role playing and formation ofcoalitions. On the Flemish side the main actor is the CVP, on the Walloon side it is the PS.The main objectives of the communities in the economie field are: temporary boarding employment in depressed industries and, simultaneously, the creation of high tech industries. Policy instruments to attain those goals are : (...) general economie measures ; selective-protective measures ; selective-innovative measures.Why is the sum-game negative or at least suboptimal?1. Mentioned policy instruments are spread over an incoherent set of institutions on the national and regional level, with rules that are partly centralist, partly federalist, partly confederalist. This leads to a complicated, unstable set of game rules in which the financial implications of decisions are shifted from the regional to the national level and vice versa.2. Selective-protective measures are of such large size that they offset and erode the beneficial effects of general policy measures regarding wages, taxes and exchange rate.Federalism or confederalism would and should establish a new set of rules between the two regions and between regional and federal state. Since a return to the ancien régime is politically unfeasible, this is the only logical way out of the present chaotic decision making process. Federalism would, inter alia, shift the financial responsibility of decisions in the field of industrial policy, education, health and public works towards the regions.This political reform requires a new constitution and therefore an agreement between the two communities. The chances for a new «talk» are presently not very high. Among the many reasons, one in particular strikes the eye : the major partner on the Flemish side, namely the Christian Democrats, have a multi-dimensional utility function, which not only is «concealed» for the others, but also undefined and unclear for the party itself. (shrink)

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

This book consists of the edited proceedings of a debate among Jurgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Leszek Kolakowski that was held in Warsaw in May of 1995. It includes also commentary from those in attendance, including extensive remarks by Ernest Gellner. The debate marked the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and focussed primarily on topics related to historicism and cultural relativism.

Max Weber’s thesis on the decisive influence of Protestant ethic on the formation and development of modern capitalism has become one of the best-known and widely shared canonical claims in social sciences. Since its publication at the beginning of the 20th century, this thesis, supported by subsequent great works by the German classic, has rarely been the subject of major controversy. The work of correcting Weber’s thesis was undertaken in the late 20th century by Michael Novak. Novak’s correction is not (...) confrontational, but complementary. The American thinker abandons the research area of minority Protestant communities, which caught Weber’s attention, and undertakes an analysis of the broader religious tradition, developing both before and after the Reformation. In particular, the achievements of Pope John Paul II, interpreted by Novak in terms of the renewal of a liberty current of Catholic social thought, provide important corrective data. (shrink)

Artykuł analizuje problem kosztów powstałych w wyniku realizacji obowiązku udzielenia pomocy osobie znajdującej się w niebezpieczeństwie. Autorzy prezentują trzy odmienne stanowiska dotyczące tego problemu, rozważając scenariusz, w którym osoba decyduje się, z własnej woli lub przymuszona za pomocą prawa, uratować inną osobę, w sytuacji, w której taka pomoc wiąże się z naruszeniem praw trzeciej strony. Przykładowo, A ratuje tonącego B, ale w trakcie ratowania narusza prawa C. Pytanie, które stawiają autorzy brzmi: zakładając, że istnieje obowiązek udzielenia pomocy osobie znajdującej się (...) w niebezpieczeństwie, kto powinien ponieść koszty odszkodowania za naruszenie praw trzeciej strony? Autorzy rozważają następujące możliwości: koszty pomocy powinny zostać poniesione przez (a) ratującego, (b) osobę, której prawa zostały naruszone, (c) ratowanego, (d) całe społeczeństwo. (shrink)

The presented paper focuses on the analysis of strategic documents at the level of the European Union concerning the regulation of artificial intelligence as one of the so-called disruptive technologies. In the first part of the article, we outline the basic terminology. Subsequently, we focus on the summarizing and systemizing of the key documents adopted at the EU level in terms of artificial intelligence regulation. The focus of the paper is devoted to issues of personal data protection and cyber security (...) included in these strategic documents. The final part contains recommendations for future research and evaluation of its key features. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to interpret and criticize the theory of theistic natural signs, formulated by Charles S. Evans. TNS are characteristic experiences or features of the world which cause the person who encounters them to form certain basic beliefs about the existence and nature of God. I propose two interpretations of how TNS work, using the categories of perception and indirect perceptual recognition. I also present two arguments against the theory of TNS. First, I point out that (...) the theory does not explain adequately why TNS are ambiguous, i.e., can be read in different ways. Second, I observe that certain experiences may be taken to be „atheistic natural signs”. Their existence gives one a reason to suspect that God is a deceiver. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than (...) the soul of the uncontrolled agent. (shrink)

In the article author analyses the extent to which it is possible to regard the Aristotelian conception of the soul as actually necessary and applicable for modern neuroscience. The framework in which this objective is going to be accomplished is provided by the idea of the coexistence of the “manifest” and “scientific” images of the world and persons, as introduced by Wilfrid Sellars. In subsequent sections, author initially formulates an answer to the questions of what it is that Aristotle sought (...) to explain with his conception of soul as formal cause, and how this notion could be portrayed in terms drawn from contemporary neurological science. It is author’s intention to show that no other concepts—be they the Cartesian “mind” or a Chalmers-style “self”—come anywhere close to matching the breadth of scope of Aristotelian “soul”. At the same time, though, analysis carried out here do not intend to undertake any kind of defence of the soul as a spiritual entity of the sort popular where religious faith is concerned, namely as an entity separable from the body, immortal, and inimitably tied to God. Then, in the second major part of the article, author analyses the extent to which the Aristotelian conception of the soul can be thought of as involving criteria of the sort that we encounter in the contemporary theory of strong emergence. According to the author the theory of strong emergence has, as a heuristic theory, quite general predictive and explanatory power as regards the field of human thought and behaviour. (shrink)

I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βούλευσις), as the standard picture (most influentially argued for in Anscombe's "Thought and Action in Aristotle", in R. Bambrough ed. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1965) suggests. Although some features of the standard view are correct (such as that decisions have essential connection to deliberation and that wish always plays a crucial role in the formation of a decision), Aristotelian (...) decisions sometimes must include non-rational desires such as appetite. Consequently, any exegetical account of Aristotle’s notion of decision must be able to accommodate this feature. (shrink)

The Struggle for Nature outlines and examines the main aspects of current environmental philosophy including deep ecology, social and political ecology, eco-feminism and eco-anarchism. It criticises the dependency on science of these philosophies and the social problems engendered by them. The author argues for a post-naturalistic turn in environmental philosophy. The Struggle for Nature presents the most up-to-date arguments in environmental philosophy, which will be valuable reading for students of applied philosophy, environmental studies and geography.

The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is (...) still in possession of her knowledge but she is unable to use it as knowledge due to the temporary disablement of her reason by appetite. Due to this disablement, the uncontrolled agent is temporarily unable to be motivated to act by her knowledge and acts merely on her appetite. Second, I argue that the second part of NE 7.3 provides an analysis of the particular mental state from which the uncontrolled action issues. Its central passage is a description of the uncontrolled agent’s state of mind before the uncontrolled action and not, as it has been traditionally understood, a description of her state of mind during the uncontrolled action. Third, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, the transition from the state before the uncontrolled action to the state in which the agent already acts without control does not involve any psychological state that would constitute the agent’s choice to abandon her decision and give in to her desires but proceeds on a purely physiological level. (shrink)

I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...) individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual). (shrink)